The Long Erosion of Trust in American Government and the Rise of Anti-Establishment Politics
Public trust in the United States federal government has declined steadily for more than half a century. While short-term crises and national successes occasionally produce temporary surges in confidence, the long-term trajectory since the late 1960s has been unmistakably downward. This erosion has not occurred because of a single ideology, political party, or policy failure. Instead, it reflects a cumulative loss of credibility driven by repeated scandals, misleading justifications, and perceived self-dealing by political and economic elites. As trust declined across generations, voters increasingly rejected traditional political leadership and became receptive to alternative figures who positioned themselves outside the established political order.
In the early 1960s, public confidence in the federal government was remarkably high. Surveys from the period show that roughly 70–75% of Americans trusted the government to do what was right “most of the time” or “just about always.” This confidence reflected the post–World War II environment: economic growth, Cold War unity, faith in expertise, and the perception that political leaders acted in the national interest. That trust, however, proved fragile.
The Vietnam War marked the first major rupture. In 1968, the Tet Offensive contradicted official government claims that victory was imminent. Although the offensive was a military failure for North Vietnam, it was a psychological turning point for the American public. The gap between official messaging and visible reality undermined confidence in government honesty. Trust fell sharply to approximately 55–60%, signaling the first major decline in modern polling history. The damage was not limited to Vietnam policy itself; it fundamentally altered how Americans evaluated government statements.
If Vietnam introduced skepticism, Watergate entrenched it. Between 1972 and 1974, revelations that a sitting president and his administration had engaged in criminal behavior—and then attempted to conceal it—shattered the assumption that corruption was confined to isolated individuals. By the mid-1970s, trust in the federal government had fallen to roughly 35–40%. More importantly, it never recovered to pre-Vietnam levels. Watergate permanently altered the public’s relationship with political authority, replacing deference with suspicion.
During the 1980s, trust stabilized but did not rebound. Polling data from the period suggests levels hovering around 40–45%. This plateau represented a new normal: Americans no longer expected moral excellence from government, but they had not yet abandoned institutional legitimacy entirely. The brief surge in confidence during the 1991 Gulf War—when trust temporarily rose to around 50%—demonstrated that effective leadership could still rally public support. However, the rally was short-lived and tied to specific circumstances rather than a renewed faith in institutions.
The early 2000s delivered another major credibility shock. The invasion of Iraq was publicly justified by claims that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction. When those claims proved false, trust declined further to approximately 30–35%. For many Americans, particularly younger ones, this episode reinforced the belief that government officials were willing to manipulate intelligence and public opinion to achieve predetermined goals. The Iraq War did not simply damage confidence in foreign policy decision-making; it reinforced a broader narrative of institutional dishonesty.
The 2008 financial crisis deepened this erosion dramatically. As major financial institutions received government bailouts while millions of Americans lost homes, jobs, and savings, trust dropped to approximately 20–25%. This moment was uniquely damaging because it fused political and economic disillusionment. The perception that elites were protected while ordinary citizens absorbed the consequences solidified the belief that the system was fundamentally rigged. Unlike earlier scandals, which could be framed as policy failures, the financial crisis suggested structural favoritism embedded within the system itself.
Throughout the 2010s, trust remained low—around 20%—as Washington appeared increasingly dominated by career politicians, lobbyists, and bureaucratic inertia. Gridlock, partisan conflict, and revolving-door relationships between government and industry reinforced the sense that political institutions existed primarily to serve themselves. For many voters, this period marked the transition from skepticism to outright rejection of the political establishment.
The COVID-19 pandemic represented another severe stress test for institutional credibility. Between 2020 and 2022, public trust fluctuated but generally declined further to approximately 15–20%. Mixed messaging, shifting guidelines, censorship controversies, and vaccine mandates fueled perceptions that political authority was inconsistent or coercive. Whether justified or not, the cumulative effect was to push trust to historic lows. By the early 2020s, only about 15–18%of Americans expressed consistent trust in the federal government.
This sustained erosion of trust has had profound political consequences. As institutional legitimacy declined, voters became increasingly receptive to candidates who framed themselves as outsiders willing to challenge entrenched power. The rise of Barack Obama in 2008 and Donald Trump in 2016 illustrates this pattern. Despite vast ideological differences, both campaigns drew strength from widespread dissatisfaction with the political establishment. Obama emphasized reform and hope in response to perceived systemic failure, while Trump explicitly attacked the political class as corrupt and self-serving. Their success reflected a common voter impulse: rejection of institutional continuity rather than endorsement of a single ideology.
Crucially, this trend is generational. Each cohort since the 1960s has inherited a lower baseline of trust than the one before it. For younger generations, distrust is not a reaction to a single scandal but a default assumption. The idea that government deserves automatic legitimacy no longer resonates. Instead, legitimacy must be earned—and institutions have repeatedly failed to do so.
The decline of trust in the U.S. government is a long-term process rather than a sudden crisis. Beginning in the late 1960s, successive credibility failures steadily reduced public confidence from roughly 75% to under 20%. Each major scandal compounded the damage of the previous one, creating a political environment defined by skepticism, alienation, and institutional fatigue. The rise of anti-establishment leaders is not an anomaly but a rational response to decades of perceived betrayal. Unless the underlying causes of distrust are addressed, the erosion of legitimacy—and the rejection of traditional political authority—will likely continue.
Gallup, Trust in Government, long-term trend data (1958–present).
Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government: 1958–2023.
Gallup, “Confidence in Institutions” historical polling series.
U.S. Department of Defense, public assessments of the Tet Offensive (1968).
U.S. Senate, Watergate Committee Reports (1974).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004).
Congressional Budget Office, Report on Financial Crisis and TARP (2009–2010).
Pew Research Center, Americans’ Trust in Government During COVID-19 (2020–2022).